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Abstract
The article tells the story of Danish cooperative housing’s radical transformation from a
collective housing good and commons to a financialized asset during the 2000s when
neoliberal housing reforms were introduced and the mortgage finance market was
deregulated. Processes of financialization of collectively owned housing have to be
understood not only in relation to the dynamics of the surrounding housing market
and political-economic changes but also to the communities and social relations that
they presuppose and feed off, often in contradictory ways, as people are motivated by
both solidarity and private interests. Housing cooperatives have existed as a form of
collective housing throughout the 20th century, balanced, on the one hand, between
the reproduction of kin, family and local communities and the common good and, on
the other, between the market and the reproduction of the base for both families, local
communities and the larger public sharing the housing commons. During the 2000s,
processes of financialization brought the market and the cooperatives’ base so close
together, primarily through new mortgaging opportunities, that families and communi-
ties have lost their savings and the base has been undermined, both in a material and an
immaterial sense.
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I thought of it [the incorporation of her rental estate as a housing cooperative] as an
investment. I thought it could be a stepping stone for me, because I thought: now I sit
in this rental apartment and I have my salary, but what if I want to move on at some
point? We [she and her former partner] were about to buy a house and had looked at
many houses, right? We were in a completely different situation, and we were two in
it. And when I became single I thought ‘God, now I am stuck in a rental apartment!’
and ‘What are my future prospects?’ And then this initiative came up, and I thought
‘Yes, there are some people who are lucky, and I am one them!’
(Dorte, June 2008)
Dorte is a member of a housing cooperative in Copenhagen, a distinct form of
tenure that has had a volatile history since they started in 1912. In a housing
cooperative, the members own their property collectively as an association, and
members do not have ownership but user rights of their apartments; what they
own is a share of the whole property. Since 1975, sitting tenants of rental apart-
ment blocks have been offered the right to buy their estate collectively and take it
over as a cooperative, whenever blocks of apartments have been put up for sale.
This happened in 2006 to the estate that Dorte lived in, and a majority of the
estate’s tenants decided to form a cooperative.
While this transformation from rental to cooperative property held promises of
both social and economic security, the story of Danish housing cooperatives is also
one of losses and insecurity. This became clear to Dorte and the other members of
the cooperative a few years later when the global financial crisis revealed how
vulnerable their newly established cooperative was. They had financed the pur-
chase of their estate in an overheated market, through short-term interest-only
loans, but the value of their property subsequently plunged. In short, the financi-
alization of housing had become central to Danish housing cooperatives.
This article tells the story of cooperative housing’s radical transformation as a
collective form of tenure during the 2000s when neoliberal housing reforms were
introduced and the mortgage finance market was deregulated. Housing cooper-
atives, which, for almost a century, had managed a collective housing good, saw
their principles being undermined and their wealth sapped. The interesting irony
of the financialization of housing cooperatives is that the moral ethos of coop-
eratives has historically acted against market speculation, but the very sense that
cooperatives provide ‘bulwarks against the market’ and collective ways of engag-
ing in the market also enabled people to borrow while feeling secure and pro-
tected by the community, and this eventually undermined the economy of many
cooperatives.
I extend Gudeman’s (2008) concept of the debasement of community economies
to explain how financialization integrates the market and the base in new, subver-
sive ways, nevertheless ending with the debasement of the collective good. The
shared materials of cooperatives’ buildings and common spaces together with the
activities, rituals, traditions and knowledge connected to their maintenance (meet-
ings, work parties, etc.) constitute the base (cf. Gudeman, 2008) of hundreds of
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local cooperative housing communities in Denmark. Moreover, all cooperatives
taken together also function as a collective good or base for larger Danish society
that is often conceptualized as a community too (Bruun, 2011, 2015). In Denmark,
cooperative associations evoke popular images of nation-building, collective strug-
gles for rural modernization in the late 19th century, the urban labour movement
in the early 20th century and egalitarian communities. This intertwined moral
economy of cooperative housing can be traced back to its entanglement with the
establishment of modern Danish welfare society.
As Laura Bear (2014) has recently re-emphasized, capitalism generates and
consists of many ethical forms and social relations, and one of the tasks of eth-
nography is to surface these concealed relations. Financialization processes, like
other capitalist economic relations, are not exterior to but presuppose and feed off
communities and social relations, as other anthropologists working on the rela-
tions between financial debts and community bonds have also demonstrated
(Guérin, 2014; James, 2014; Palomera, 2014).
Financialization is ‘the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, prac-
tices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting in a structural
transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states and
households’ (Aalbers, 2016: 2). It is the process by which something, e.g. an apart-
ment block, is managed as a fund: A financial asset and investment vehicle for
other projects or purposes. Housing has become increasingly important as a form
of capital asset that contains risk and has to be managed, and this changes the role
of housing in people’s lives. Homeownership and the accumulation of private
housing wealth has been promoted across much of the world since the second
half of the 20th century, but the expansion of credit facilities, the deregulation
of mortgage markets, the introduction of reverse mortgages and other financial
products have made housing an increasingly flexible asset that people are encour-
aged to use to boost their consumption or to pay for their welfare (O’Mahony and
Overton, 2015). The global financial crisis from 2008 onwards revealed how wide-
spread and powerful the financialization of housing has become. In fact, the finan-
cial crisis was triggered by the bursting of the US housing bubble that caused the
values of securities tied to real estate to crash, and debt crisis in housing spread all
over the world.
Urban sociologists, geographers and political economists have described the
macro processes behind housing financialization (Aalbers, 2016), mortgage
securitization (Gotham, 2012), credit scoring of aspiring homeowners, predatory
lending and foreclosures (Immergluck, 2009). However, while creditors and finan-
cial experts assume that people accept risk into their lives when they take loans, we
lack ethnographic studies of communities who dwell in financialized housing,
including their notions of risk and indebtedness and the moral economies of hous-
ing, including social and economic values, that they enact. A growing number of
ethnographic studies have analysed mortgagors’ own narratives about and expe-
riences of indebtedness and foreclosures (Corsı ´ n Jime!nez, 2017; Jefferson 2013;
Stout, 2016). Most of these studies focus on private homeownership, particularly
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in countries like the US, UK and Spain, where private homeownership is promoted
by governments and constructed as a token of recognition of citizenship or nation-
al belonging, of personal freedom or of ‘having arrived’ in life, in the recipient
country or in the middle class (Perin, 1977; Sabaté, 2016).
Housing financialization, however, goes much further than the promotion of
private homeownership through predatory lending schemes for low-income house-
holds and impoverished groups. As Aalbers (2016) points out, there are many
mechanisms of financialization. Public and semi-public social housing associations
increasingly rely on housing bonds and financial products, and, even in countries
that have traditionally safeguarded affordable housing for all citizens, states have
been the drivers of financialization through neoliberal housing politics. In many
European countries much social housing is, or has been until recently, collectively
owned and/or democratically controlled by active tenants’ associations, but we
know very little about the processes through which these collectives too have
accepted, and sometimes actively promoted, financialization. The concept of
moral economy opens up such analyses. As argued in the introduction to this
volume, the concept of moral economy does not just refer to particular entangle-
ments of social relations, values and norms, often in contradictory ways, but is
embedded in the dynamics of the surrounding housing market and political-
economic changes.
Cooperatives have always been related to markets and were already partly com-
modified, but the neoliberal housing politics and processes of financialization in
the 2000s penetrated the moral economy of cooperative housing in new ways and
began to undermine it, leading to a debasement of the collective housing good.
After an introduction to Danish housing cooperatives in general, and the processes
of neoliberalization and financialization in the 2000s, in the second part of the
article, I investigate how the financialization played out in Dorte’s cooperative, a
cooperative that was founded at a precarious moment during the ‘bull market’ and
plunged in the following ‘bear’ period.
The ethnography is based in fieldwork I conducted in 2008–2011 in eight dif-
ferent housing cooperatives in Copenhagen. Some of the housing cooperatives
I have known since the 1990s. This long-term engagement enables me to document
people’s hopes and dreams before the crisis set in and to follow their lives during
the economic crisis and in its aftermath when they had to re-orientate their beliefs.
The moral economy of Danish housing cooperatives
The history of Danish housing cooperatives is closely tied to the development of
social housing and the welfare state in the 20th century. The first efforts to improve
the housing conditions for workers in the industrializing cities were philanthropic
projects and mutual building societies. The building societies that relatively afflu-
ent workers joined were, however, wound down when the workers had paid off
their loans, and the members became private owners of their houses. In 1912, the
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first cooperative housing associations were established as a speculation-free, non-
profit alternative to the building societies.
Housing politics and the provision of housing for the growing urban population
was a crucial battlefield in the interwar period and a cornerstone in the process that
led to the establishment of the Danish welfare state. The Social Reform Act of
1933 that laid the foundation for the development of welfare state institutions was
a compromise between the Social Democratic and the Liberal Party. Part of this
compromise was an association-based model of social housing, originating in the
cooperative movement that was a unifying democratic institution in the modern-
ization of Danish society (Richman, 1995). As a result, unlike many other
European welfare states, social housing has never been owned by the state or
state agencies in Denmark but by cooperatives and non-profit housing associations
that balance between the market and the state and guard a collectively owned
common good .
The Scandinavian countries adopted a universal welfare model, which means
that welfare benefits, including access to affordable housing, are for all citizens
regardless of their economic situation. There is no separate housing market for
social housing, but there is a notion of a fair price (cf. Thompson, 1971), and the
state provides correctives to the general housing market, e.g. through rent regula-
tion (Bengtsson, 2001). This also implies a recognition that all types of tenure are
subsidized one way or another by the state,1 and that state, market and third sector
housing associations are imbricated. Approximately 20% of all dwellings in
Denmark are owned by non-profit social housing associations, 7% by private
housing cooperatives (the subject of this article), 15% by private landlords and
58% by owner-occupiers (Kristensen, 2007). In the city of Copenhagen, one third
of all housing is owned by private housing cooperatives.
Housing cooperatives are a form of ‘collective private property’ (Larsen and
Hansen, 2015) between rental and owner-occupied housing. In 1975, tenants
received a collective right of first refusal when private landlords put their rental
estates up for sale. If the majority of tenants form a housing cooperative, they can
buy the estate at the market price2 on the same terms as any other buyer and take
over their estate as a cooperative. The estate’s purchase is financed by members’
deposits (which, in turn, secure them shares in the cooperative) and a collective
mortgage loan taken out by the housing cooperative as a legal entity. The members
pay off their collective mortgage through monthly housing fees that also cover
interest and the management and upkeep of the building. This represents a kind of
collectivization of private property, but is not without social consequences for the
old working-class neighbourhoods where the estates were typically located. The
remaining tenants, if there are any, continue as tenants in the housing coopera-
tives, with the same rights and rent payments, but, when they move out, their
apartments are turned into cooperative apartments and sold to new cooperative
members. Tenants who join the cooperative are no longer eligible for rent allow-
ance from the municipality, and the value of their share can be offset against
their pensions, so the most vulnerable citizens often do not join the cooperatives.
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This has over the years led to a ‘gentle gentrification’ (Larsen and Hansen, 2008) of
the old working-class neighbourhoods in Copenhagen.
Though cooperatives have been an active part of processes of urban renewal
and gentrification since the 1970s, with new groups of citizens, particularly
students, moving to the de-industrializing cities, they also build principles of dem-
ocratic participation and self-organization. One of the characteristic features of
housing cooperatives were work parties when the members got together to paint,
build and clean up their buildings and yards, to save money and to build an
egalitarian sense of community that cuts across social classes and social hierar-
chies. Participating in a work party is an activity that not only symbolizes helping
out one’s neighbours in the cooperative but also signals an attitude toward par-
ticipating in society at large (Bruun, 2011). Housing cooperatives, with their ideals
of collective living and the cooperative ideology, function as a model of, and model
for, modern Danish welfare society and national identity, though many of my
informants at times found it quite claustrophobic to live in a cooperative being
watched over by their neighbours. The moral economy of Danish housing coop-
eratives thus echoes the larger political economy of housing in Danish society as
they take care of a valuable housing good and perform ideals of democratic and
egalitarian citizenship. They also make space for local cooperative members’ life
projects, plans to secure their kin and individual acquisition, but are balanced
against the long-term reproduction of the collective and its moral order
(cf. Parry and Bloch, 1989).
Housing cooperative members meet once a year at the general assembly, the
highest authority of each housing cooperative, where all members have a vote,
the executive board is elected, and the accounts and the budget are adopted. At the
general assembly, members settle on the price of shares in their cooperative, the
andelskrone named after the Danish currency the Crown (krone). The andelskrone
is a development index of the members’ pro rata shares of the whole cooperative
and relates to the original deposits at the time of the cooperative’s incorporation.
The andelskrone embodies the value of the cooperatives in a double sense:
The compound term points to two aspects of value, the cooperative community
(andel-) and the exchange value (-krone, which is the name of the Danish currency).
The andelskrone thus reflects the ‘two sides of the coin’ (Hart, 1986): It is simul-
taneously the product of political authority and the specification of value for
exchange.
In the 1980s and 1990s, most housing cooperatives used the original purchase
price of their building or the comparatively low public valuations to calculate the
andelskrone and share prices, in line with the original non-profit ideology of coop-
erative housing. When cooperative members, usually those who were planning to
sell their shares and move out, proposed to raise the prices, a majority in the
general assembly argued that ‘cooperatives should offer affordable dwellings for
all’ and voted against this on the basis of the cooperative ideology. With the rising
property prices in Copenhagen at the end of the 1990s, more and more members
suggested using the market value of the property as assessed by a real estate
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appraiser. Yet, as long as only those who moved out of the cooperative could
realize some capital gains, other members had no economic interest in higher
share prices. Another mechanism that kept share prices below market value was
the fact that new members were often recruited among existing members’ friends
and kin, a nepotism for which cooperatives were regularly criticized. These mech-
anisms were effectively dismantled by neoliberal reforms introduced in the 2000s.
Neoliberalization of the cooperative housing commons
A Liberal-Conservative government came to power in 2001 and presented its new
housing policy as a ‘reduction of the state’s role in housing provision’ (Regeringen,
2002). This way of introducing political reforms point to an important contradic-
tion inherent in neoliberalism: ‘Neoliberal reform “arrives” through state institu-
tions yet as a commitment to dismantling the state in some respects (by delegation,
deregulation, and privatization in particular)’ (Greenhouse, 2010: 5).
One of the programme’s objectives was the market orientation of cooperative
housing that included allowing members to take out mortgages to buy their indi-
vidual shares in the cooperative. Cooperative associations should no longer be able
to forbid their members to borrow against their individual shares. The original
‘mortgaging ban’ that associations could impose on their members was lifted in
2005. This, presumably small amendment to the Cooperative Housing Act, caused
little debate in the Danish parliament, but had enormous repercussions in the
housing cooperatives: Now it was no longer only those members who wanted to
sell their shares and move out who got advantages of high property valuations, but
also those who wanted to stay in the cooperative and could borrow money from
the bank against their share. Moreover, new members could obtain a cooperative
apartment by borrowing against their share. This meant that they had two mort-
gages: A collective mortgage together with the whole cooperative and a mortgage
on their private share. Share prices rose tremendously, and cooperative property
was effectively transformed from an illiquid, spatially fixed housing wealth held
collectively by a community to a liquid security for individual members
(cf. Gotham, 2012).
Moreover, interest-only loans were introduced for homeowners, including hous-
ing cooperatives as legal entities in 2003. This means that cooperatives can defer
payments on their collective mortgage loans up to 10 years, and the monthly fees
that the members pay are no longer used to bring down the loan but to pay
for interest. Before 2003, mortgage loans in Denmark were based on repayments
over 30 years and cooperatives would therefore accumulate wealth by paying their
collective loans. Cooperatives that had existed since the 1920s, or were incorpo-
rated in the 1970s and 1980s, were more or less debt-free, unless they had refi-
nanced their 30-year mortgage loans to raise money for building improvements.
The older cooperatives were thus guardians of real wealth that generations of
cooperative members had saved up.
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Since 2003, however, many of these older, affluent cooperatives began to think
about their community economies in financial terms and take interest-only loans
for new renovations or just to keep their monthly payments down. Housing coop-
eratives were seen as broader investments before financialization turned them into
capital assets. They were a base and security for the future, but not in financialized
terms. Cooperatives represented a collective housing good in Danish society and,
ideally, secured affordable dwellings for all citizens, even if new members in many
cooperatives were in fact not recruited from all layers of society but primarily
among the members’ kin and acquaintances. Moreover, cooperative property
was an investment in the local community, and members could also pass on
their apartments to their children, if they chose to live in the cooperative, and in
this way, they could secure their kin’s future. With new opportunities to restructure
their community economies, however, the nature of these broader investment pos-
sibilities was displaced by a more singular instrumental end. Via individual loans
against the shares, capital became liquid and mobile and could be invested else-
where than in the cooperative’s property itself.
In one cooperative, that had to finance a large renovation of their roof and
façade, a member of the board argued for interest-only loans in front of the general
assembly in the following way:
[The renovation] is a long-term investment in our property that many of the future
residents will benefit from. Therefore, it would not be fair if only we who live in the
cooperative today have to pay for it and therefore we think it is all right to take
interest-only loans for some years (. . .) Then we can see in some years’ time if we have
become richer and can start to make payments on the loan.
If property is defined as relationships between people through things (Hann, 1998),
the range of different relationships that cooperative property express changed
during these years. The financialization of cooperative property severs the relation-
ships between present cooperative members and creates potential relationships with
imagined wealthy future members. It also eliminates the possibility for cooperatives
to provide affordable dwellings for all. New significant relationships are those
between cooperative members, banks, financial and legal advisers who now play
a prominent role in the day-to-day management of cooperatives and the decisions
made at general assemblies.
In the older, affluent cooperatives, the mechanisms that kept share prices down
were undermined. As one chairman of a housing cooperative explained to me:
If we now kept the prices of cooperative shares [andele] really low, this does not
preclude the possibility that people at the next general assembly will decide to raise
the prices. We cannot decide a principle today that 100 years from now the andel-
skrone must be 80 percent of the public property valuation in order to ensure cheap
dwellings in Copenhagen. And if we have cheap apartments here and sell our
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apartments cheap, it will be difficult for people to get on in the system. It would be to
bond people to this place.
The bond (stavnsbåndet) was a serfdom-like institution that existed in Denmark in
the 18th century and bonded men between the ages of 14 and 36 to live on the
estates where they were born, similar to tied accommodation in rural England after
the Enclosure Acts. Many members of cooperatives used this metaphor of the
bond to argue for raising share prices in their cooperatives. Thus, neoliberal pol-
icies that aimed to make cooperatives’ capital liquid had a powerful discursive
parallel in the popular metaphor of ‘abolishing the bond’. Just as one of the dis-
tinct logics of capital accumulation is the tendency of capital to eliminate spatial
and temporal barriers to the realization of exchange value (Marx in Gotham, 2012:
25), so the opportunity to mortgage individual shares eliminated those barriers in
the cooperatives, and cooperative housing apartments became mobile capital.
When it came to financing new cooperatives, major changes arrived in 2003 too.
Due to the general appreciation of the housing market, the purchase prices of
housing estates were very high, and new cooperatives bought their properties at
inflated prices that later collapsed. Cooperatives as legal entities and collective
owners could borrow up to 80% of their property’s appraised value as a mortgage
loan to finance the purchase and raise the remaining 20% through ordinary bank
loans that banks were more than willing to give in the mid-2000s. In this way, new
cooperatives were established based on precarious calculations, but nobody real-
ized the risks, as leverage and booming markets was the order of the day in the
early 2000s.
Establishing a cooperative in 2006: Money in the pocket
Dorte’s estate is located in a deprived neighbourhood in Copenhagen called
‘Nordvest’ (Northwest), as it lies northwest of the city centre. In the mid-2000s,
the neighbourhood was not yet affected by ‘gentle gentrification’, but nicknamed
‘Nordværst’ (Northworst), implying that it was the city’s worst neighbourhood.
Ironically, the estate and the area around it were originally planned and
constructed in the 1930s as a progressive family-orientated working-class neigh-
bourhood based on the planning philosophy ‘from cradle to grave’. The area
offered a kindergarten, a school, apartments of different sizes for different life
stages, workplaces and shops, a nursing home for the old, and even a crematorium
and a graveyard, so that the inhabitants could stay in the same area their whole
lives (and after). The estate’s rectangular red-brick construction, built around an
open courtyard, was large and airy compared to the damp and dark tenement
blocks that dominated the city back then.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Nordvest absorbed many of the city’s social problems
related to unemployment, alcohol and drugs when other districts went through
large-scale urban regeneration programmes and tenants were rehoused in
Nordvest. The municipality stopped investing in the properties, allocated
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apartments to homeless people and cash welfare recipients, and the estate became
known as the Danish equivalent of a British sink estate characterized by economic
and social deprivation. Young people in search of affordable housing could
‘always find an apartment here’, my fieldwork informants told me, including stu-
dents who came to the city from other parts of the country like Dorte.
When I met Dorte for the first time in 2008, she recalled that one of the reasons
why the tenants wanted to form a cooperative was because they wanted to create a
sense of community and local solidarity in the old estate:
One of the things I thought about when we founded our housing cooperative was that
it might lead to more social cohesion out here. Because this [the lack of cohesion] was
problematic. There was no sense of community here at all. It has become better now,
and it is a large apartment block, but [the cohesion and the sense of community] is still
not like it is in small cooperative associations.
Housing cooperatives were known for ‘community’ among their members, and,
during the first years of the cooperative’s existence, traditions like work parties and
commons meals did indeed bring about a stronger sense of community. Yet, as
reflected in the epigraph above, Dorte and others also counted on making a profit
from becoming members of the new cooperative. Such contradictory aspirations
are integral to the moral economy of cooperative housing; it was never just a
matter of altruism but of providing housing for members who also wanted to
make a life for themselves and their families. With financialization, however,
members’ hopes were inflated during the housing market’s ‘bull’ period. The pre-
viously small profits that members could make when they sold their cooperative
apartments turned into large profits, and the cooperatives as collectives simply
became stepping stones in this process.
In 2005, a property administration company had contacted the tenants’ associ-
ation and offered its services in setting up the cooperative. According to the com-
pany’s financingmodel based on the deferred payments of an interest-onlymortgage
loan, the tenants would not have to put down any money up front, but could
exchange funds from their mandatory saving accounts for shares in the new coop-
erative. The cooperative would be incorporated in January 2006, and already at the
cooperative’s first general assembly, the same year (they said) the cooperative could
raise their share prices and the members’ shares would multiply. Dorte told me that
she had calculated that it would always pay to join the cooperative. It was a mystery
to her why some of her neighbours chose not to join the cooperative but stay in the
building as tenants: ‘Are they unable to understand the most basic economic mech-
anisms?’ she asked me repeatedly, ‘They can get money right in their pocket’.
A quick equity
Most of the tenants decided, after all, to join the cooperative. Ken was in his 50s
when the cooperative was incorporated and he became a member. When I met him
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in 2008, he worked as a social worker and expressed strong opinions on the
government’s and municipality’s lack of ‘a real social housing policy’. He also
criticized his cooperative for having become ‘a new stock market’ where the mem-
bers speculated on rising housing prices, and he told me that many of the old
tenants had got into trouble by mortgaging their shares:
I know many of the old toughs out here. Some of them thought ‘I can get a quick
equity’ and went to the bank and mortgaged their cooperative share and lived on the
fat of the loan in the local pub for some time. [He laughed] And now they owe the
bank 400,000 DKK (appr. 60,000 USD). They are the losers of the housing lottery,
and housing should not be a lottery; having a home is way too important for that.
A local social worker confirmed to me that some substance users became cooper-
ative members when new cooperatives were incorporated in the neighbourhood
and subsequently lost their apartments and ended up homeless, because they failed
to pay their fees to the cooperative or defaulted on the loan borrowed against their
share.
Later, in the same conversation, Ken told me that since he could not prevent his
cooperative becoming a new stock market, he figured he might as well join in. At
that time everyone was talking about home equity (cf. Sj!rslev, 2012), and Ken
wanted to partake in equity-based consumption and a middle-class lifestyle. For
the money he borrowed against his cooperative share, he and his wife celebrated
their wedding and went on holidays abroad. He recalled how eager the banks were
to lend him the money: ‘You just went on the internet and wrote the bank such and
such, and then you received an answer within five minutes that, sure, they agreed
and asked you to come down to the bank for a personal meeting’.
Affective hedging
Laura and Morten belong to the ‘new generation’ that moved in after the estate
became a cooperative. They bought their share from the cooperative when an old
tenant moved out. They do not remember if she died or just moved to a residential
home, but they know she had lived in the apartment for many years, because the
old cupboards in the kitchen were still intact. Laura and Morten were looking for a
place in the city they could afford and where they could start a family as soon as
they had finished university. They had mortgaged their share when they bought the
apartment in 2006 and borrowed the down payment from Morten’s parents. Two
years after they moved in they had their first child. They were happy that more and
more young families had moved into the cooperative in the last couple of years.
Morten became a member of the cooperative’s board, because he wanted to learn
about the process of setting up a cooperative.
When the cooperative was founded, an overall renovations plan for the building
envisaged that a new roof would be needed within the next decade. This meant that
the cooperative would have to take a supplementary bank loan, but, with the
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financial crisis in 2008, this became practically impossible, because the cooperative
was no longer credit worthy. A new appraisal in 2009 showed that the coopera-
tive’s liabilities by far exceeded its assets. The property had been bought at an
inflated price in 2006, and its value was now 15–22 million USD lower. In the
autumn of 2009, the board had to call for an emergency general assembly to
inform all members about the financial situation. The share prices were set at 10
times less than those of the previous year, and the members’ monthly fees increased
to pay for the rising mortgage interest. New cooperative members like Laura and
Morten who had bought their shares at the peak of the market were now techni-
cally insolvent.
When I visited Laura and Morten in 2011, they had postponed their plans to have
another child, because they could not afford a larger apartment and would suffer a
large loss if they sold their apartment now. Ironically, Laura used the same metaphor
that so many members of older cooperatives had used to argue for raising share
prices, namely that they were stuck and ‘bonded’ in their cooperative. They were
happy that they had good jobs and expected further salary raises in the future.
It is much worse for those people in our cooperative who are unemployed or live off a
pension that does not increase. They may have counted on staying in their apartment
and cannot afford any further rises of the monthly fees which will surely come.
Laura and Morten concluded that they had no regrets when they looked back on
their decision to buy the cooperative apartment, because there was no way they
could have foreseen their present problems:
Laura: The whole understanding of housing cooperatives was that it was not a risky
thing.
Morten: I had seen the cooperative’s annual reports and noticed that it was an
interest-only loan with deferred repayments, but I thought: ‘Things will turn out
fine’. And that we had to run the risk of rent increase because there was a great
demand for apartments at that time, so we did not have so many other options.
Like Laura and Morten, most members of housing cooperatives in Copenhagen saw
cooperatives as bulwarks against the housing market and a safe way to enter the
housing market, because they thought the collective hedges its members against the
market’s risks and fluctuations. However, as the story of their cooperative testifies,
this kind of affective hedging only worked before the financialization of cooperatives.
Housing cooperatives that have turned their base into a financialized asset depend on
the swings of the market and no longer function as bulwarks against it.
Sustaining losses
In 2011, many members’ earlier hopes of what the establishment of a cooperative
would bring them have been dashed. Dorte was disillusioned with the cooperative’s
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inability to bring people closer together: ‘It was utopian to think that we could
achieve social cohesion with so many people’. She told me that the last work party
was held in 2009. A large number of cooperative members did not live in the
building anymore but were subletting their apartments, and none of these sub-
tenants showed up for the work parties, so they decided to cancel them.
When I look back on the whole process, I should have been more suspicious. ‘If so
many vote for this, we can sell our shares at a higher price’. That alone should have
set the alarm bells ringing! But the mortgage bank assessed the building at the same
high valuation as the real estate appraiser. That was the reason we could borrow the
whole purchase price. (. . .)
Maybe I had just hoped that at least I would get the economic profit that was held out
as a prospect. I must conclude that we have been seduced into something by our own
greed. I have calculated that I have lost around 240,000 DKK (appr. 36,000 USD) in
these five and a half years if I don’t get back the money I paid for the share and count
the extra monthly fees I paid. All this money went to the property administration
company and the mortgage bank.
Dorte tried to sell her cooperative apartment, but a real estate agent told her that
there was ‘no market for this kind of cooperative housing’. Finally, she found a
buyer, but she described him as a ‘deeply criminal type’ who wanted to pay for the
share in cash. However, she could not be picky and was happy just to get rid of it.
For her, the building had gone full circle and was now becoming like the old sink
estate again, just that people had shares in the building, shares that they would
eventually have to give away for free, while the cooperative, effectively, rented the
building from the mortgage bank.
By 2016, the whole cooperative was declared technically insolvent. It owed
approximately 12,000,000 USD more to the mortgage bank than the building
was worth. The inspection report said that the roof had passed its ‘technological
lifetime’ (70 years for a tiled roof), so the roof was living on credit too. Ken no
longer lived on the estate. He had divorced and left the cooperative and the city.
He still owed the bank a lot of money (he didn’t want to say how much), and even
though he would only get a nominal price for the share he would still be liable for
the loan.
Conclusion
When Dorte and her fellow tenants established their cooperative in 2006, they
thought they would continue the historical ethos of cooperatives, the long tradition
of housing cooperatives providing affordable housing and secure tenure for ordi-
nary citizens, and build a strong community economy, member solidarity and local
democracy. And, on top of that, as a new feature of cooperatives in a booming
housing market, they thought that they would also earn individual profits to fulfil
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personal dreams and life projects, such as buying a house and starting a family in
Dorte’s case. But financialization has transformed the moral economy of housing
cooperatives. As a consequence, some of the central features of cooperative hous-
ing are disappearing: There are fewer work parties, and instead of bringing down
collective mortgages, making savings for the future and thus investing in the col-
lective wealth, cooperatives are taking out loans and general assemblies are
increasingly bound to these loans. In many cooperatives, leaking roofs and
neglected façades testify that the material structures of the communities’ base
are being undermined and that what should be the base of thriving, historically
even wealthy housing communities, has been debased. This is particularly clear in
cooperatives like Dorte’s cooperative that was incorporated at a precarious
moment, but is also true for already-existing cooperatives which became mort-
gaged. Although there are still many well-functioning cooperatives, financializa-
tion poses a fundamental challenge to the moral economy of cooperatives in
general. If local communities do not invest in the long-term reproduction of
affordable housing the collective housing good that was safeguarded by coopera-
tives is undermined. The financialization of cooperatives thus reaches further than
the fragmentation and anxieties within the local communities when their property
values plunge; the total moral economy of housing in modern Danish welfare
society and the association-based model for social housing are destabilized.
In economic theory, debasement refers to the practice of lowering the value of
currency, e.g. gold or silver coins where the quantity of the precious metal is
reduced. Similarly, the andelskrone in housing cooperatives is debased, and the
materials and activities that make up the value of cooperatives’ base are not pre-
served for the future. Financialization has changed the members’ time frames for
broader investments in the cooperatives preventing them from accumulating col-
lective wealth and reproducing their base. In this way, financialization processes
consume the base on which they rely. If cooperatives are seen as an index for the
modern Danish welfare society, the horror of the story of their collapse is the
symbolic implication that the same is in store for Denmark.
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Notes
1. Private homeownership is indirectly subsidized too through tax reliefs on housing mort-
gage interest payments.
2. One of the major problems, especially during the housing bubble, is how such ‘market
prices’ are determined. It can be discussed from the perspective of the sociology of
markets (Callon, 1998), what ‘the market for housing estates’ is and how it is performed,
particularly during the overheated years of the housing bubble, abound in investment
capital.
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(More Housing. Growth and Renewal on the Housing Market). Regeringen (The
Government): Copenhagen.
Richman N (1995) From worker cooperatives to social housing: The transformation of the
third sector in Denmark. In: Heskin AD and Leavitt J (eds) The Hidden History of the
Cooperative. Davis, CA: Cooperative Centre University of California, pp.143–162.
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